Source: Reuters

For almost twelve years, Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have dominated Turkish politics, winning all elections since, the most recent one in March 2014. This essay will endeavour to provide an insight into how and why is it that the AKP and Erdoğan, all the criticism and scandals notwithstanding, remain the political power number one in Turkey.

1. The context of Erdoğan’s rise to power

The party won the elections in 2002 in the background of, as described by Istanbul lawyer Selim Yavuz1, “a society that was sick of political and economic chaos, of unstable   coalition governments, inflation, high unemployment, constant political and economic instability and no good prospects for the future”.2 Therefore, when in 2002 the AKP won a landslide victory against its opponents and formed a one-party cabinet for the first time since 1987, the Turkish society was “excited”, Yavuz continues, with people’s main expectations on Erdoğan “to stabilise Turkey’s economy and politics”. Further, in a country that for decades had to strictly set religion aside in the Ataturk’s Republic, Erdoğan’s openly Islamic rhetoric reassured the hopes of many in Turkey (a country with a 99% Muslim population3). And one may well argue that the AKP hardly failed living up to many of these hopes, as will be analysed.

2. Turkey’s political, strategic and economic growth under Erdoğan

Even Erdoğan’s most fierce opponents would find it difficult to deny that Turkey’s economic, political and strategic importance has been steadily growing since the AKP took power.

2.1. The economy under AKP rule

The economic policies adopted by the AKP raised the GNP4 from $300 billion in 2002 to $750 billion in 2008, and the average annual per capita income from $3,300 to over $10,000 in the same period. The real GDP5 rose by 64 percent during 2002-2012, and real GDP per capita by 43 percent.6 This is not a bad record of growth, and the AKP government, even if indeed, as often alleged,  corrupt, it most certainly has delivered on the economic field with a very visible rise in the income level and standard of living of the average Turkish citizen.78 This is a significant factor that must not be overlooked when analysing Erdoğan’s electoral successes.

2.2 Political stability. The army as a factor in Turkish politics

There is a one element of Turkish democracy that renders unique – the military. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Father of the Turkish republic, was a vehement opponent of the inclusion of religion in the politics, and to this aim, he envisaged the military to be the guardian of secularism in Turkey, or the guardian of the Republic. The army, however is not just a calm, stand-by guardian; it has been actively involved in the political life of Turkey, with several military coups staged against democratically elected civilian governments in the last decades. Thus, the military is an element that the AKP leader has had to take very seriously into account.

And indeed, Erdoğan has found his own way to address the issue of the military – he has decreased the army’s influence in politics since he came to power through various means – change of the constitution, attempts to influence top officers, as well as outright suppression, arrest and imprisonment.910 The result is that the army is less likely than any time in the last decades to stage a coup or to actively meddle in Turkey’s political life. In this way, Erdoğan has assured he has all the space for any political manoeuvres he may wish, and it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge this as an integral element of Erdoğan’s relatively long rule.

2.3 Restoring Turkey’s image internationally

It is not only Erdoğan’s religiously observant image or the economic successes that appeal to his followers. It is his combative personality – the fact he does not hesitate to take on the entrenched Turkish elite as well as global powers – that appeals to them as well. He personifies the desire of the majority of the Turkish population to demonstrate that they count both domestically and internationally; that they are autonomous actors both at home and abroad.11 Example of this new approach to foreign policy is Turkey’s active role in the Syrian crisis, its extended involvement in the Balkans, the Middle East, and, generally, towards all its ex-Ottoman vilayets12. Some have called it “neo-Ottomanism” — an attempt to restore the former Ottoman Empire and its vanished regional glory. Whatever the label, Turkey managed to become a key foreign policy player in the eyes of American and European leaders.13

3. Authoritarianism, corruption, scandals, human rights violations and Erdoğan still in power: how is it possible?

Some Turkish commentators seem puzzled by the fact that “half of the corruption claims [faced by Erdoğan] in any other democratic country would be enough for the collapse of the government.”14 In Turkey, this is clearly not the case.

3.1 No real alternative: “Uninspiring opposition”

There is another aspect of the story – the opposition, as a commentator put it, is “uninspiring”.15 For example, Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP, the next most popular party after AKP), is riven by divisions and is hampered by the lack of a compelling leader to take on Erdoğan.16 Although, undoubtedly, the party’s leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu did his best in the circumstances of the March 2014 elections, the CHP’s competition with the AKP is an unbalanced one on most fronts – poor media coverage and low support in the Kurdish regions, to name a few. The Nationalist Party of Turkey is also hardly a match to the support that the AKP receives.17 Therefore, even though Erdoğan’s rule is far from perfect, to say the least, it quickly becomes apparent that there is virtually no viable alternative.

3.2 Media coverage and freedom of press (or lack of it thereof)

According to the Middle-East journal Al-Monitor’s Turkey’s Pulse,Turkish mainstream media appears to be under the direct control of AKP elites.18 An example they give is that it has been a long time that Erdoğan participated in any one-on-one live19 debate with an opposition leader, attributing it to the assumption that all media outings are well-designed to minimise any ‘mistakes’.

This leads to the second element, namely, the “information deficiency.” The majority of the AKP’s core electoral base – 80%, according to the SONAR Research Centre – do not get their news from the Internet (which is also diligently filtered by the government anyway, e.g. recent shut-down of Twitter in late March 2014).20 The point to make here is: for the vast majority of AKP voters, there is a Turkey that might be completely different to what we as outsiders may perceive it to be, and this is a factor very important to recognise in understanding Erdoğan’s support in Turkey.

3.3 Repression of any dissent

Repression of any kind of dissent, be that be journalists, intellectuals, judges, or military officers, is commonplace in Turkey and has become integral part of Erdoğan’s rule. Arrest and imprisonment of large numbers of journalists, NGO activists, or top military officials is no news in Turkey. In terms of law, this has been made possible through various controversial changes of legislation that have widened the scope of some crucial criminal definitions, such as 'enemy of the State’ or 'offence against the State’ etc.21 For example, Turkey has the highest number of journalists behind bars, and it has recently jailed almost 200 members of the military for “plotting a coup d'Etat” against Erdoğan’s government.22 Although Erdoğan’s electoral victories cannot be attributed only to repression, it clearly shows the methods used to crush any dissent with a view to ensuring a full control over any 'inconvenient’ elements within the country, thus strengthening further AKP’s grip on power.

4. Conclusion

For reasons, some of which discussed above, one may perceive today’s Turkey as an ever more authoritarian state, with Erdoğan and his AKP steadily going down the road of dictatorship.23 However, in spite of the AKP’s colourful and controversial background and its inconsistent human rights record24, it must be acknowledged that the party has managed to address a number of major problems. Since the AKP’s assumption of power in 2002, the political scene has been much more stable and any need for military intervention has been averted, something not to be taken for granted in the Turkish context.25 The economy is yet another area in which Erdoğan’s government has performed remarkably.

Therefore, I would argue that, on the basis of the analysis above, it is most evident and natural that Erdoğan’s support seems not to dwindle with the years and scandals. It appears that the Turkey that we as outside observers see is not quite the same as the Turkey seen through the eyes of those living there and voting for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, an assertion seemingly proven by the recent elections.

1 Important to note is that Yavuz himself could hardly be considered a supporter of the AKP, as his father, a renowned general within the Turkish military, is now imprisoned for 14 years, sentenced with “plotting a coup”.

2 As quoted in De Putter, J., Minidocu: Turkije onder spanning. Verliest premier Erdoğan de macht? (Mini-documentary: Turkey under tension. Is Erdoğan losing the power?), April 2014, De Correspondent.

3 According to Government statistics, quoted in Country Profile – Turkey, January 2006, United States Library of Congress, 2008-1;

4 Gross National Product

5 (or GDP at constant prices)

6 Rodrik, D. How well did the Turkish economy do over the last decade?, Dani Rodrik’s weblog, June 20 2013

7 Ayoob, M., Erdoğan’s election victory could be good news for Turkish democracy, The Guardian

8 De Putter, Jos, In Turkije zou dit niet uitgezonden worden (In Turkey, this would not be broadcast), April 2014, De Correspondent.

9 Vezenkov, A., Ислямът и демокрацията в Турция (Islam and Democracy in Turkey), 16.03.2013

10 De Putter, J, Minidocu: Turkije onder spanning. Verliest premier Erdoğan de macht?(Mini-documentary: Turkey under tension. Is Erdoğan losing the power?),  April 2014, De Correspondent.

11 Ayoob, M., Erdoğan’s election victory could be good news for Turkish democracy, The Guardian, 31.03.2014.

12 The Vilayet was the administrative unit at the times of the Ottoman empire, equivalent to Italy’s “regione”.

13 Ishlir, A., Turkish foreign policy in the Erdoğan era, Middle East Monitor, 23.01.2014, accessed on 01.05.2014

14The Naked Truth of Turkish Politics, Hurriyet Daily News, 31.03.2014,

15 Vick, K., Can Turkey’s Erdoğan Stay in Power?, The TIME, 27.02.2014,

16 Ibid.

17The Naked Truth of Turkish Politics, Hurriyet Daily News, 31.03.2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/analysis-the-naked-truth-of-turkish-politics.aspx?pageID=449&nID=64325&NewsCatID=409)

18 Trembley, P. Who still supports Turkey’s AKP? Al-Monitor, 2nd March 2014

19 And therefore more difficult to predict and control.

20 Ibid.

21 The Economist, Enemies of the state, Mar 17 2012.

22 De Putter, J., Minidocu: Turkije onder spanning. Verliest premier Erdoğan de macht? (Mini-documentary: Turkey under tension. Is Erdoğan losing the power?), April 2014.

23 For example, Yetkin., M. noted: “Here is the naked truth: Half of the corruption claims in any other democratic country would be enough to collapse the government; in Turkey it cost only a 5 point drop in support for Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in the March 30 local elections.” (The Naked Truth of Turkish Politics, Hurriyet Daily News, 31.03.2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/analysis-the-naked-truth-of-turkish-politics.aspx?pageID=449&nID=64325&NewsCatID=409).

24 Credible human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have documented grave violations of press freedom, freedom of expression and the fundamental rights, such as those of the Kurdish minority, for example.

25 See s2.2 on the importance and relevance of the military in Turkish political life.